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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Gerald Voss contends that the district court erred when it denied his motion to 
suppress, which contended there was no reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop 
for speeding, as Mr. Voss was permissibly accelerating toward a section of road with a 
higher speed limit.  Accordingly, this Court should vacate the district court’s order of 
judgment and commitment and reverse the order denying his motion to suppress. 
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 Mr. Voss, with his wife riding on the back, pulled his motorcycle out of the parking 
lot of Cruiser’s Bar and began heading east on Seltice Way and out of the town of 
Stateline.  (Tr., p.11, Ls.2-6.)  He revved his engine as he did so, which he explained 
was a “farewell” to some friends still at the bar.  (Tr., p.64, Ls.8-9.)  Officer Lind was 
driving westbound on Seltice “a few hundred yards” down the road.  (See Tr., p.52, 
Ls.9-14; see also Tr., p.42, Ls.17-21 (the officer marking his location on Defendant’s 
Exhibit 1); Aug. p.1.1)  The officer heard Mr. Voss’s motorcycle engine “roar,” looked 
over to see it accelerating, and estimated Mr. Voss to already be travelling at 50 miles 
per hour.  (Tr., p.45, Ls.8-11.)  He activated his radar, which he said reported Mr. Voss 
was travelling at 45 miles per hour.  (Tr., p.49, Ls.16-18.)   
The applicable speed limit for that section of Seltice is somewhat peculiar, as it 
appears the speed limit in one direction (westbound) is 45 miles per hour, and the 
                                            
1 A motion to augment the appellate record with a copy of Defendant’s Exhibit 1, 
an aerial depiction of the area around Cruiser’s Bar, upon which both Mr. Voss and 
Officer Lind marked various landmarks and positions (Aug. p.1), has been filed 
contemporaneously with this brief. 
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speed limit in the opposite direction (eastbound) is 35 miles per hour.2  (See generally 
Tr.; Exhibits, pp.2-6; Aug. p.1.)  Officer Lind initiated a traffic stop based on his radar 
reading that Mr. Voss was driving eastbound on Seltice in excess of 35 miles per hour 
before reaching the 45-mile-per-hour sign displayed for eastbound drivers.  (Tr., p.50, 
Ls.8-11.)  The district court noted that, in the video of the traffic stop, that 45-mile-per-
hour sign could be seen as Officer Lind turned around to initiate the traffic stop.  
(Tr., p.71, Ls.10-24.)  The officer ultimately arrested Mr. Voss for driving under the 
influence.  (See, e.g., R., pp.7-14.) 
 Mr. Voss moved to suppress the evidence from the stop, arguing that there was 
no reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop because it was permissible for drivers 
to accelerate as they approach a speed limit sign which increases the limit going 
                                            
2 The markings on Defendant’s Exhibit 1 depict the conflicting speed zones in this area.  
(See Aug. p.1; see generally Tr. (both Mr. Voss and Officer Lind described, at various 
points in their testimony, the markings they made on Defendant’s Exhibit 1).)  In brief 
summary, Crusier’s is at the east end of the town of Stateline, and the limit for 
eastbound traffic, such as Mr. Voss, through the town is set at 35 miles per hour.  
(Tr., p.38, Ls.17-21.)  A 45-mile-per-hour sign is displayed for eastbound traffic east of 
the intersection between Seltice and Ante Road, which is beyond the east end of the 
Cruiser’s parking lot.  (Tr., p. 16, Ls.6-11, p.39, Ls.3-15; see also Exhibits, p.4 (depicting 
the eastbound 45-mile-per-hour sign).)  Opposite that eastbound 45-mile-per-hour sign 
is a sign warning westbound traffic of “Reduced Speed Ahead.”  (Tr., p.16, Ls.11-14; 
see Exhibits, p.2 (depicting the westbound “Reduced Speed Ahead” sign in relation to 
the intersection between Seltice and Ante, as well as the parking lot for Cruiser’s Bar).)  
A 35-mile-per-hour sign for westbound traffic is not displayed until the west end of the 
Cruiser’s parking lot.  (Exhibits, p.6 (specifically showing the westbound 35-mile-per-
hour sign in relation to the Cruiser’s Bar parking lot); see also Exhibits, p.2 (showing 
westbound Reduced Speed Ahead sign in relation to the westbound 35-mile-per-hour 
sign, though the westbound 35-mile-per-hour sign is partially obscured); but see 
Tr., p.40, Ls.6-9 (Officer Lind testifying that he believed the westbound 35-mile-per-hour 
sign was actually displayed where the westbound “Reduced Speed Ahead” sign is 
displayed).) 
3 
forward.3  (R., pp.33-46.)  Based on the testimony given at the hearing, he also argued 
that it would have been impossible for him to have accelerated to 45 miles per hour at 
the point which Officer Lind first saw him.  (Tr., p.68, Ls.5-17; see Tr., p.59, L.18 - p.61, 
L.11 (Mr. Voss testifying about his motorcycle’s acceleration capabilities); see also Tr., 
p.44, Ls.20-25 (Officer Lind indicating that he marked where he first saw the motorcycle 
on Defendant’s Exhibit 1); Aug., p.1.)  The district court denied the motion to suppress, 
concluding that, as a matter of law, the speed limit did not change until the point where 
the sign is posted, and thus, accelerating prior to the sign constitutes speeding.  
(Tr., p.72, Ls.19-25.)  The district court also found Officer Lind credible in his testimony 
about the radar showing Mr. Voss’s speed in exceeding 35 miles per hour before the 
35-mile-per-hour speed zone ended.  (Tr., p.71, L.10 - p.72, L.9.) 
Mr. Voss subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea reserving his right to 
appeal the order denying his motion to suppress.  (Tr., p.74, Ls.13-25.)  In the interim, 
Mr. Voss began participating in a substance abuse program provided by the 
Department for Veterans’ Affairs.  (See Tr., p.84, Ls.22-25.)  As a result, the State 
recommended his sentence be suspended, and defense counsel requested a withheld 
judgment.  (Tr., p.85, Ls.1-5, p.86, Ls.16-18.)  The district court imposed a unified 
sentence of three years, with one and one-half years fixed, which it suspended for a 
two-year period of probation.  (Tr., p.87, Ls.19-23.)  Mr. Voss filed a notice of appeal 
timely from the Judgment of Conviction.  (R., pp.78, 90.)   
                                            
3 Mr. Voss initially also argued that his consent to a subsequent breath test was not 
valid (R., pp.43-46), but trial counsel subsequently withdrew that argument in light of a 





Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Voss’s motion to suppress. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Voss’s Motion To Suppress  
 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, this Court accepts the trial court's findings of fact 
which were supported by substantial evidence, but it freely reviews the application of 
constitutional principles to the facts as found.  The District Court Erred In Denying 
Mr. Voss’s Motion To.  “At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of 
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is 
vested in the trial court.”  State v. Conant, 143 Idaho 797, 799 (2007). 
Mr. Voss maintains that there is no reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop 
based on speeding when the driver is accelerating toward a speed sign which increases 
the speed limit going forward.  In doing so, he is mindful that the Court of Appeals has 
held “the placement of the stop sign [sic] determined the applicable speed limit,” State v. 
McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119, 124 (Ct. App. 1999), and that the Manual on Uniform Traffic 
Control Devices, which Idaho has adopted,4 provides that “Speed Limit (R2-1) signs, 
indicating speed limits for which posting is required by law, shall be located at the points 
of change from one speed limit to another.”  U.S. Department of Transportation, Manual 
on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, p.56 (2009) available at http://mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov/ 
pdfs/2009/pdf_index.htm.  If there is no reasonable suspicion to justify the initial 
detention, the evidence obtained during that detention must be suppressed.  See, e.g., 
State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 491 (2009).  
                                            
4 (See R., p.37 (citing “ID ADC 39.03.41.004” for the proposition that Idaho has adopted 




Mr. Voss respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order of 
judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress. 
 DATED this 5th day of August, 2016. 
 
      /s/_________________________ 
      BRIAN R. DICKSON 
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